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Abstract 
The item-specific proportion congruent (ISPC) effect is the observation that the Stroop effect is 
larger for words that are presented mostly in congruent colours (e.g., BLUE presented 75% of 
the time in blue), and smaller for words that are presented mostly in a given incongruent colour 
(e.g., YELLOW presented 75% of the time in orange). One account of the ISPC effect, the 
modulation hypothesis, is that participants modulate attention based on the identity of the word 
(i.e., participants allow the word to influence responding when it is presented mostly in its 
congruent colour). Another account, the contingency hypothesis, is that participants use the word 
to predict the response that they will need to make (e.g., if the word is YELLOW, then the 
response is probably orange). Reanalyses of data from Jacoby, Lindsay, and Hessels (2003) 
along with results from new experiments are inconsistent with the modulation hypothesis, but 
entirely consistent with the contingency hypothesis. A response threshold mechanism for using 
contingency information is proposed and tested. 
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The Stroop Effect: Why Proportion Congruent has Nothing 
to do with Congruency and Everything to do with Contingency 
 Contingency learning is a lively area of research (e.g., Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; 
Musen & Squire, 1993; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman, & Besner, 2007). One popular domain for 
this research is the Stroop paradigm. The standard Stroop effect is the finding that participants 
take longer to identify the print colour of an incongruent colour word (e.g., the word GREEN 
printed in red; GREENred) relative to a congruent colour word (REDred; Stroop, 1935; see 
MacLeod, 1991, for a review). The magnitude of the Stroop effect changes when the proportion 
of congruent items is manipulated (Lowe & Mitterer, 1982). In particular, the Stroop effect 
increases as the proportion on congruent trials increases. The standard account of the influence 
of proportion congruent (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Lowe & 
Mitterer, 1982) is that the detection of these proportions allows participants to modulate attention 
to the word, thereby changing the size of the Stroop effect. However, Schmidt et al. (2007) 
suggest that simple contingency learning provides a sufficient account of the proportion 
congruency effect. Here, we provide a reanalysis of the Jacoby et al. (2003) data and report new 
results from our own laboratory that are consistent with the Schmidt et al. (2007) suggestion and 
at the same time are problematic for the modulation hypothesis. Possible mechanisms by which 
participants use contingency information to control responding will also be considered. 
Proportion Congruency and the Modulation Hypothesis 
 A number of experiments (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Lowe 
& Mitterer, 1982) have shown that the magnitude of the Stroop effect can be modulated by 
varying the proportion of congruent trials. Specifically, the Stroop effect is larger when most of 
the items in the experiment are congruent (high proportion congruent) than when most of the 
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items are incongruent (low proportion congruent). The standard explanation of this effect 
(Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Lowe & Mitterer, 1982), here termed the 
modulation hypothesis, is that participants strategically modulate attention to the word depending 
on the proportion of congruent items. For instance, when the word and colour match most of the 
time (high proportion congruent), participants attend to the word more than usual. This will 
speed up responses on congruent trials (increased facilitation) and slow down responses on 
incongruent trials (increased interference), making for a larger Stroop effect. In contrast, when 
the word and the colour mismatch most of the time (low proportion congruent), participants 
make a greater effort to ignore the word. This decreases both facilitation from congruent words 
and interference from incongruent words, making for a smaller Stroop effect. Thus, the 
modulation account holds that participants use information about proportion congruency to 
decide the degree to which they will attend to the word and thus to allow the word to impact 
performance in colour identification. 
 The modulation hypothesis seems to be the most widely accepted explanation for the 
proportion congruent effect. For instance, Lowe and Mitterer (1982) conclude that their findings 
“demonstrate the strategic modulation of selective attention” (p. 698) and Lindsay and Jacoby 
(1994) state that the effect “suggests that when most items are incongruent, subjects somehow 
inhibit the influence of word-reading processes, relative to when most items are congruent” (p. 
225). 
 Although intuitively appealing, the modulation hypothesis has difficulty explaining some 
findings. Given the assumption that participants modulate attention to the word, it would be 
expected that this modulation would be task-wide. That is, words should be ignored throughout a 
low proportion congruent block and attended to throughout a high proportion congruent block. 
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However, Jacoby et al. (2003) manipulated proportion congruency for each item (i.e., each 
colour word) such that some words were presented most often in their congruent colour (e.g., 
BLUEblue) and other words were presented most often in a particular incongruent colour (e.g., 
ORANGEyellow). A proportion congruent effect was still observed, even though high and low 
proportion congruent stimuli were intermixed. Jacoby et al. called this finding the item-specific 
proportion congruent (ISPC) effect. As Jacoby et al. point out, this finding is difficult to 
accommodate within the modulation hypothesis framework, because it would have to be 
assumed that participants are modulating attention to the word on a trial-by-trial basis depending 
on the identity of the word (e.g., if the word is BLUE, then the word is attended, but if the word 
is ORANGE, then the word is ignored). In essence, to defend the modulation account it would 
have to be maintained that participants decide whether to attend to the word after they have 
already read it. 
Response Prediction and the Contingency Hypothesis 
 A different account of the ISPC effect, here termed the contingency hypothesis, is that 
participants implicitly learn contingencies (i.e., correlations) between words and responses and 
then use said contingencies to predict the specific response associated with each distracting word 
(Schmidt et al., 2007). For instance, if the word ORANGE is presented most often in yellow, 
then upon processing the word ORANGE participants will (unconsciously) predict that the 
correct response will be yellow. This response prediction allows participants to shortcut some 
processing (thus speeding responding) if the predicted response is indeed the correct one. When 
a word accurately predicts the correct response (e.g., BLUEblue, where BLUE is presented most 
often in blue), we call this a high contingency trial. When the word predicts the wrong response 
(e.g., BLUEgreen), we call this a low contingency trial. When the word does not predict a specific 
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response (e.g., PINKbrown, where PINK is presented equally often in all colours), we call this a 
medium contingency trial. 
 It is important to note that we are not the first to point out a role for contingency in the 
Stroop task. Dishon-Berkovits and Algom (2000; see also, Malara & Algom, 2003; Sabri, 
Melara, & Algom, 2001) have argued that when words and colours are correlated, participants 
will pick up on this cue, attend to the content of the word, and use that content to aid responding. 
For instance, in three experiments using a word-word version of the Stroop task they 
demonstrated that a Stroop effect is only observed when the correlation between words and 
colours is non-chance. When the correlation is chance, they claim, participants do not attend to 
the content of the distracting word. While their account is not as specified as the current account 
(indeed, their argument could even be construed as a variant of the modulation hypothesis), their 
work has highlighted the importance of correlational cues on responding. 
 Although the modulation hypothesis has difficulty explaining the ISPC effect, the 
contingency hypothesis does not. According to the contingency hypothesis, in the high 
proportion congruent condition responses to congruent trials will be faster than usual, because 
participants can use the word to successfully predict the response (e.g., BLUEblue; high 
contingency). The same advantage does not occur for incongruent trials in this condition 
because, for instance, BLUE does not accurately predict an incongruent green response (low 
contingency). Thus, by speeding congruent but not incongruent trials, the difference between 
incongruent and congruent trials (the Stroop effect) will be larger (i.e., relative to a condition 
where words are not predictive of responses). Similarly, in the low proportion congruent 
condition responses will be faster for incongruent items, because participants can use the word to 
successfully predict the response (e.g., ORANGEyellow; high contingency). The same advantage 
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does not occur for congruent trials in this condition because, for instance, ORANGE predicts a 
yellow, not an orange response (low contingency). Thus, by speeding incongruent but not 
congruent trials, the overall Stroop effect will be smaller. 
 According to the contingency hypothesis, then, proportion congruency manipulations are 
confounded with contingency. Specifically, as demonstrated in Table I, in the high proportion 
congruent condition the magnitude of the Stroop effect is inflated due to confounding higher 
word-response contingencies for the congruent (.75) relative to incongruent (.25) items. 
Similarly, in the low proportion congruent condition the Stroop effect is reduced due to 
confounding higher word-response contingencies for the incongruent (.75) relative to congruent 
(.25) items. Fixing this confound is as simple as rearranging the cells in the design. Rather than 
comparing high contingency congruent trials with low contingency incongruent trials (the high 
proportion congruent condition), we can compare high contingency congruent trials (from the 
high proportion congruent condition) with high contingency incongruent trials (from the low 
proportion congruent condition). Similarly, rather than comparing low contingency congruent 
trials with high contingency incongruent trials (the low proportion congruent condition), we can 
compare low contingency congruent trials (from the low proportion congruent condition) with 
low contingency incongruent trials (from the high proportion congruent condition). After making 
this adjustment, the contingency hypothesis predicts a main effect of Stroop trial type 
(congruent, incongruent), a main effect of contingency (high, medium, low), and, more critically, 
no interaction between the two. In contrast, the modulation hypothesis predicts an interaction, 
because incongruent trials should be more affected by attention given that the majority of the 
Stroop effect is interference, with little or no facilitation from congruent trials (see MacLeod, 
1991, for a review). 
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TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
Facilitation and Interference 
 The contingency hypothesis claims that participants use response prediction to speed 
responses on high contingency trials. There are undoubtedly several mechanisms that could be 
proposed to explain how this occurs. For the purpose of this paper we will test the a priori 
hypothesis that participants prepare for a response by lowering the threshold for the expected 
response. As shown in Figure 1, for instance, if the word ORANGE is presented most often in 
yellow, then presentation of the word ORANGE will lead the participant to reduce the threshold 
for a yellow response. Consequently, it will take less activation of this potential response for it to 
be made. This mechanism therefore predicts response time facilitation on high contingency trials 
(where the predicted response is correct) relative to medium contingency trials (where no 
prediction is made). However, no interference for response time is expected on low contingency 
trials (where the predicted response is incorrect) relative to medium contingency trials, because 
on both low and medium contingency trials the response threshold for the correct response is at 
the normal level. For instance, if BLUE is presented most often in blue, then when participants 
are given the low contingency trial BLUEgreen they will see the word BLUE and expect a blue 
response. As such, the response threshold for the (incorrect) blue response will be lowered, but 
the threshold for the (correct) green response will not be changed. As a result, it will take just as 
long to make a correct green response as it would if no prediction were made. Thus, the 
contingency hypothesis predicts response facilitation, but not response interference for response 
times. 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 It is important to articulate why this account does not predict interference on low 
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contingency trials. On a low contingency trial (e.g., BLUEgreen), the distracting word is predictive 
of a specific response (i.e., BLUE predicts a blue key response). Thus, the threshold for this 
predicted response will be lowered. However, the response threshold for the remaining colours 
(green, yellow, and orange) will be unaltered. Because the correct response (green) is not the 
predicted response (blue), correct response latencies will not be speeded. 
Summary 
 The first goal of the present investigation is to reanalyze the Jacoby et al. (2003) ISPC 
Stroop experiment to test predictions derived from the contingency hypothesis. Specifically, it is 
expected that contingency and Stroop effects will act separately and that there should therefore 
be no interaction between Stroop trial type and contingency. That is, the size of the Stroop effect 
should be the same for words with .75 contingencies (i.e., high-proportion-congruent congruent 
words vs. low-proportion-congruent incongruent words) as it is for words with .25 contingencies 
(i.e., low-proportion-congruent congruent words vs. high-proportion-congruent incongruent 
words) or any other contingency. Congruent and incongruent trials should be faster in the high 
contingency condition, but the difference between congruent and incongruent trials should not 
vary with contingency. In a final analysis, high contingency and low contingency trials are 
compared to medium (chance) contingency trials to assess, respectively, facilitation and 
interference. Based on the response prediction model, the expectation is that the contingency 
effect will be solely facilitative for response latencies. In other words, although there is a benefit 
in responding to items where the words have greater than chance contingencies, there is no cost 
in responding to items where the words have lower than chance contingencies. 
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Reanalysis 1 – Jacoby et al. (2003) Response Latencies 
Method 
 Sixteen participants named the colour (green, white, blue, yellow) of colour words 
(GREEN, WHITE, BLUE, YELLOW). Individual words were presented 75%, 50%, or 25% of 
the time in their congruent colour, and in a selected incongruent colour the remaining trials (i.e., 
each word appeared in two colours only). Responses were verbal. Further details on the method 
of this experiment can be found in the original paper by Jacoby et al. (2003). For the purpose of 
these analyses, the means for congruent and incongruent trials in Experiment 2a of Jacoby et al. 
were rearranged as a function of word-response contingency: high (.75), medium (.50), and low 
(.25). Thus, the high contingency condition consists of congruent trials with high proportion 
congruent words and incongruent trials with low proportion congruent words, the medium 
contingency condition consists of congruent and incongruent trials with medium proportion 
congruent words, and the low contingency condition consists of congruent trials with low 
proportion congruent words and incongruent trials with high proportion congruent words. 
Results 
 The response latency data (along with the original organization of the data) are presented 
in Figure 2. A 3 (contingency; high, medium, low) x 2 (Stroop trial type; congruent, incongruent) 
ANOVA for response latencies revealed a main effect for contingency, F(2,30) = 3.848, MSE = 
1513, p = .033, ŋp2 = .204, and a main effect for Stroop trial type, F(1,15) = 35.235, MSE = 4902, 
p < .001, ŋp2 = .701. Critically, and as predicted, no interaction was observed between 
contingency and Stroop trial type, F(2,30) = .284, MSE = 668, p = .755, ŋp2 = .019. Although 
Type II error is always a concern when interpreting a null finding, the measure of effect size (ŋp2) 
indicates that the interaction term explains less than 2% of the variance in the results,1 thus 
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reinforcing the claim that this is a true null (or at least very small) interaction. 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 Congruent and incongruent trials for each contingency level were then averaged and 
planned comparisons were conducted to test the hypothesis that the entire contingency effect is 
driven by response facilitation on high contingency trials. As expected, there was a significant 24 
ms advantage for high contingency trials (609 ms) relative to medium (chance) contingency 
trials (636), t(15) = 2.293, SEdiff = 11, p = .036, ŋp2 = .260. The 1 ms numerical difference 
between medium contingency (636) and low contingency trials (635) was not significant, t(15) = 
.180, SEdiff = 10, p = .859, ŋp2 = .002. 
Discussion 
 The results of this reanalysis confirm the two hypotheses stemming from the contingency 
hypothesis. First, contingency and Stroop effects act separately, in that these factors produced no 
interaction. Second, as predicted by the response threshold model, the contingency effect is 
entirely facilitative for response latencies. As discussed in the introduction, these findings 
provide further empirical support for the contingency hypothesis, which holds that participants 
use distracter words to predict responses thereby shortcutting some processing when this 
prediction is successful (high contingency trials) relative to when response prediction is 
unsuccessful (low contingency trials) or not attempted (medium contingency trials). 
 These findings undermine the modulation hypothesis, which asserts that participants 
modulate attention to the word based on the proportion congruency of the distracter words. Of 
particular importance, if it is assumed that participants increase attention to the word on high 
proportion congruent trials, then not only should congruent trials (high contingency) be speeded 
relative to the chance condition due to increased facilitation (observed), but incongruent trials 
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(low contingency) should be slowed relative to the chance condition due to increased 
interference (not observed). Similarly, if participants suppress the word on low proportion 
congruent trials, then not only should incongruent trials (high contingency) be speeded relative to 
the chance condition due to decreased interference (observed), but congruent trials (low 
contingency) should be slowed relative to the chance condition due to decreased facilitation (not 
observed). Further, because interference is substantially larger than facilitation in the Stroop task, 
incongruent trials should have been more influenced by attention than congruent trials, resulting 
in an interaction between contingency and Stroop trial type (not observed). Thus, these data 
entirely support the contingency hypothesis, but are in important ways inconsistent with the 
modulation hypothesis. 
 Consistent with our findings, Logan, Zbrodoff, and Williamson (1984, Experiment 3) 
reported a null interaction between contingency and Stroop trial type for a four-choice Stroop 
task with a standard task-wide proportion congruent manipulation. In that experiment, the 
difference in response latencies between high and low contingency congruent trials was the same 
as the difference between high and low contingency incongruent trials. Logan et al. also reported 
a pair of two-choice experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) where an interaction between 
contingency and Stroop trial type was observed. This could be regarded as a potential problem 
for the contingency hypothesis described here. However, it is important to note that task-wide 
proportion congruency manipulations (two-choice especially) are subject to confounding 
sequential effects (i.e., trial-to-trial modulations of word reading). For instance, if the word on 
the previous trial was congruent, then the Stroop effect will be larger on the current trial 
(probably due to increased attention to the word; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; see Schmidt 
et al., 2007, for a similar finding of sequential contingency effects). Given that more trials are 
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preceded by a congruent trial in a high proportion congruent block than in a low proportion 
congruent block, it seems that simple proportion congruency experiments are ill suited to test the 
present hypotheses.2 The ISPC paradigm used here, on the other hand, is able to rule out the 
sequential trial confounds, because each trial type is preceded by the same proportion of every 
type of trial (i.e., there are no systematic sequential confounds). 
Reanalysis 2 – Jacoby et al. (2003) Percentage Error 
 The first reanalysis demonstrated that when the proportion of congruent items is 
manipulated the resultant variations in the size of the Stroop effect can be explained by 
confounded contingencies. In the current section, we expand on the contingency hypothesis used 
to generate the predictions for the first analysis and test some novel predictions that fall out of 
this account. In particular, whereas the response threshold mechanism described earlier predicts 
only facilitation in response latencies, it predicts both facilitation and interference in errors. The 
reason that facilitation is predicted on high contingency trials for errors is the same as that for 
response times: the threshold for the correct (predicted) response is lower. Consequently, it takes 
less time to make a correct response and it is highly unlikely that participants will make another 
(incorrect) response due to the relatively lower threshold for the correct response compared to 
the incorrect responses. 
 Unlike for latencies, where no response interference was expected, response interference 
is predicted for errors because the threshold for one of the competing (incorrect) responses is 
lowered relative to the correct response and to the other incorrect responses. For instance, for the 
stimulus BLUEgreen, the threshold for the blue response is lowered. However, the blue response is 
not the correct response. Thus, there is a heightened probability that participants will make an 
error and select this predicted incorrect response (blue) over the unpredicted correct response 




 There were 16 participants in Experiment 2b. Experiment 2b was identical in all respects 
to Experiment 2a, except that participants had only 550 ms (rather than 2000 ms in Experiment 
1) to respond. This procedure increases the number of errors, which increases the power to detect 
effects in the error data. For the purpose of these analyses, the means for congruent and 
incongruent trials in Experiment 2b of Jacoby et al. were rearranged as a function of word-
response contingency: high (.75), medium (.50), and low (.25). 
Results 
 The percentage error data (along with the original organization of the data) are presented 
in Figure 3. Overall, error rates were high (.14 - .61), reflecting the difficulty of producing a 
correct response before the 550 ms deadline. A 3 (contingency; high, medium, low) x 2 (Stroop 
trial type; congruent, incongruent) ANOVA for percentage error revealed a main effect for 
contingency, F(2,30) = 8.827, MSE = 0.8, p < .001, ŋp2 = .233, and a main effect for Stroop trial 
type, F(1,15) = 114.481, MSE = 2.9, p < .001, ŋp2 = .798. As predicted, no interaction was 
observed between contingency and Stroop trial type, F(2,30) = .126, MSE = 0.8, p = .882, ŋp2 = 
.004. Again, the effect size measure (ŋp2) suggests that this is a true null (or at least very small) 
interaction, explaining less than 1% of the variance in the results. 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 Congruent and incongruent trials for each contingency level were then averaged and 
planned comparisons were conducted to test the hypothesis that the contingency effect has both a 
facilitative effect on high contingency trials and an interfering effect on low contingency trials. 
As expected, there was a significant 4.4% advantage for high contingency trials (32.3%) relative 
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to medium (chance) contingency trials (36.6%), t(15) = 1.854, SEdiff = 2.4, p = .042 one tailed, 
ŋp
2
 = .106, and a significant 5.2% disadvantage for low contingency trials (41.9%) relative to 
medium contingency trials, t(15) = 2.315, SEdiff = 2.3, p = .035, ŋp2 = .156. 
Discussion 
 The results of the second reanalysis provide further support for the response threshold 
mechanism of the contingency hypothesis. Specifically, whereas only facilitation was observed 
in response latencies, both facilitation on high contingency trials and interference on low 
contingency trials were observed in the error data. It is atypical for an account to make 
differential predictions for response latencies and errors, so the present findings constitute strong 
and thoroughly consistent support for the contingency hypothesis. The experiments that follow 
test some even more fine-grained hypotheses generated from the contingency hypothesis. 
Experiment 1 
 The contingency hypothesis presented here holds that participants implicitly learn 
contingencies and implicitly use them to aid responding. Further, we propose a mechanism 
whereby participants use contingency information to reduce the response threshold for the 
predicted response. This account successfully predicted facilitation with no corresponding 
interference when response latency was the dependent variable, but both facilitation and 
interference when error percentage was the dependent variable. Further, contingency effects 
operate separately from the Stroop effect, a finding supported by the null interactions between 
contingency and Stroop trial type. To further test the contingency hypothesis, Experiments 1 and 
2 investigate contingency effects in the contingency learning paradigm developed by Schmidt et 
al. (2007) using colour-unrelated words. 
 It could be argued that the size of the Stroop effect was only incidentally equivalent in the 
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high, medium, and low contingency conditions. It could also be claimed that the failure to find 
increased interference in the high proportion congruent condition and decreased facilitation in 
the low proportion congruent condition were merely Type II errors. But the modulation 
hypothesis rests on the critical assumption that the reason for variations in the size of the Stroop 
effect is that participants detect the proportion of congruent items. The contingency hypothesis, 
on the other hand, makes no such claim. According to the contingency hypothesis, words and 
responses merely have to be correlated; colour-related words are not even needed to observe 
contingency effects. 
 In that vein, Schmidt et al. (2007; see also Musen & Squire, 1993) report several 
experiments that provide further support for the contingency hypothesis interpretation of the 
ISPC effect by showing that contingency effects can be observed in the absence of a Stroop 
effect. In their experiments, colour-unrelated words (e.g., MOVE) were presented most often in a 
given colour (e.g., MOVE 75% of the time in blue, SENT 75% of the time in green, etc.). Key 
press responses were faster to high contingency trials (e.g., MOVEblue) than low contingency 
trials (e.g., MOVEgreen). Thus, the results of these experiments confirm that participants are able 
to use words (even when they are colour-unrelated) to predict what response to make. This is a 
critical result, because the modulation hypothesis cannot accommodate these findings given that 
the words and colours have no congruency relation that can be used to decide whether or not to 
attend to the word. 
 Experiments 1 and 2 use the Schmidt et al. (2007) paradigm to demonstrate contingency 
effects in the absence of any congruency relations. These experiments include a medium 
contingency condition (not used by Schmidt et al.) to demonstrate a facilitation-only pattern in 
the response latencies (Experiment 1) and facilitation and interference in errors (Experiment 2) 
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to mirror the main effects observed in our reanalyses of Jacoby et al. (2003). 
 Experiment 1 was a two-choice, rather than a four-choice, task (in part to ensure that the 
interactions observed by Logan et al., 1984, were not attributable to something more than 
sequential confounds). In Experiment 1, several colour-unrelated words were presented most 
often in a randomly-assigned colour. For instance, SEVEN may have been presented 75% 
percent of the time in blue and 25% of the time in green. Other words, for instance CHAIR, were 
presented in blue and green equally often. This type of manipulation creates high contingency 
(.75; e.g., SEVENblue), medium contingency (.50; CHAIRblue), and low contingency (.25; e.g., 
SEVENgreen) trials. Experiment 1 focuses primarily on response latencies, with the goal of 
replicating the facilitation-only pattern of results observed in Reanalysis 1. 
 Experiment 2 uses the response deadline procedure used in Jacoby et al. (2003), where 
participants are given a very short amount of time to respond, to maximize errors and focuses on 
error percentages. Experiment 2 attempts to replicate the findings observed in Reanalysis 2 and 
tests new predictions from the response threshold model. Both experiments are key press, rather 
than naming, tasks. 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-four University of Waterloo undergraduates participated in 
Experiment 1 in exchange for course credit. 
 Apparatus. All stimuli were presented on a standard computer monitor and responses 
were made on a QWERTY keyboard. Participants pressed the “f” key for blue and the “j” key for 
green. Stimulus presentation and response timing were controlled by E-Prime (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2002). 
 Materials and Design. There were three display words (SEVEN, GLIDE, CHAIR) and 
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two display colours (blue, green) in the experiment. The words were selected to be of the same 
length. For each participant, one of the words (e.g., SEVEN) was presented most often (three out 
of four times per block) in blue, another word (e.g., GLIDE) was presented most often (three out 
of four times per block) in green, and the final word (e.g., CHAIR) was presented equally often 
(twice each per block) in blue and green. Assignment of words to colours was counterbalanced 
across participants. Words were presented in bold 18 point Courier New font. The RGB values 
for the stimulus colours were 0,0,255 (blue) and 0,255,0 (green). There were three contingency 
levels in the experiment: high (.75; e.g., SEVENblue), medium (.50; e.g., CHAIRblue), and low 
(.25; GLIDEblue). 
 Procedure. There were 420 trials in this experiment, consisting of 35 blocks of 12 trials 
each. On each trial, a white (255,255,255) fixation cross (i.e., “+”) was presented in the middle 
of a black screen for 250 ms. This was followed by another 250 ms of blank screen, followed by 
the stimulus display. The stimulus display was presented until a response was made or until the 
trial timed out at 2000 ms. Correct responses were followed by a blank screen for 250 ms before 
the next fixation cross. Incorrect and null responses were followed by the messages “Incorrect” 
and “Too Slow,” respectively, for 1000 ms in red (255,0,0). 
Results 
 The dependent measures for Experiment 1 were mean correct response latencies and error 
percentages. All responses shorter than 250 ms or longer than the response deadline were 
considered spoiled trials and were excluded from analysis (less than 0.2% of the trials). 
 The mean correct response latencies for Experiment 1 are presented in Figure 4. A one-
way ANOVA on contingency (high, medium, low) for response latencies was significant, 
F(2,66) = 3.902, MSE = 162, p = .025, ŋp2 = .106. As expected, planned comparisons revealed 
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that high contingency trials (437 ms) were responded to faster than medium contingency trials 
(444 ms), t(33) = 3.223, SEdiff = 2.1, p = .003, ŋp2 = .239. Also as predicted, no difference was 
found between medium and low contingency (445 ms) trials, t(33) = .395, SEdiff = 3.4, p = .696, 
ŋp
2
 = .005. For this latter comparison, there was high power (.8) to detect an effect as small as 6 
ms. 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 Errors were infrequent in Experiment 1, as shown in Figure 4. An ANOVA on 
contingency (high, medium, low) for error percentages was significant, F(2,66) = 3.987, MSE < 
.1, p = .023, ŋp2 = .108. Although the means were numerically in the expected direction, there 
was only a marginal difference between high (4.4%) and medium contingency trials (5.2%), 
t(33) = 1.763, SEdiff = .5, p = .087, ŋp2 = .086, and a non-significant difference between medium 
and low contingency trials (5.7%), t(33) = .941, SEdiff = .5, p = .353, ŋp2 = .026. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 successfully replicated the finding of response facilitation for high 
contingency trials with no response interference for low contingency trials relative to medium 
(chance) contingency trials in a task with colour-unrelated words. This provides further support 
for the claim that the “proportion congruent” effect is in fact not due to modulations in the 
Stroop effect, but is instead due to a confounding of Stroop and contingency effects. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 investigated whether the same pattern of facilitation and interference in 
errors observed in the ISPC task would be seen with a simple contingency task. In addition, 
Experiment 2 tested a novel prediction from the contingency hypothesis. The argument for the 
presence of response interference on low contingency trials is that, because the threshold for the 
Contingency Learning     20 
 
(incorrect) predicted response is lowered, participants will be more likely to erroneously select 
this predicted response rather than the correct response for the colour. For instance, for the 
stimulus MEETgreen, where MEET is presented most often in blue, participants will predict a blue 
key response based on the word. This will result in the threshold for the blue response being 
lowered and will therefore increase participants’ tendency to incorrectly make this response (i.e., 
because lowering a response threshold can be likened to loosening the trigger for this response to 
fire). An observation of response interference in errors supports the notion of a response 
threshold mechanism, but this account further predicts that the inflation of errors in the low 
contingency condition is due solely to an increase in the specific predicted response rather than 
just an increase in errors in general. For instance, in a four-choice task, we should expect 
increased blue key errors for the stimulus MEETgreen, but no increased yellow or orange key 
errors. Although yellow and orange would also be incorrect responses, they are not the predicted 
incorrect response. Thus, it should be expected that more than a chance number of errors in the 
low contingency condition (33% of incorrect responses) should be the predicted response. 
Moreover, after correcting for this inflation of errors for the predicted response, response 
interference should no longer be observed. 
Method 
 Participants. Ninety-five University of Waterloo undergraduates participated in 
Experiment 2 in exchange for course credit. None had participated in Experiment 1. 
 Apparatus. The apparatus for Experiment 2 was identical in all respects to Experiment 1, 
with one exception. Experiment 2 was a four-choice task (which was necessary to test the 
hypotheses regarding predicted versus unpredicted errors); participants pressed the “a” key for 
blue, the “z” key for green, the “m” key for yellow, and the “k” key for orange. 
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 Materials and Design. The materials and design for Experiment 2 were identical to 
Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. There were six new display words (LOOP, FINS, 
MEET, SLID, CALL, TUBE) and four display colours (blue, green, yellow, orange). For each 
participant, one of the words was presented most often (six out of twelve times per block) in 
blue, another most often in green, another most often in yellow, and another most often in 
orange. These words were presented equally often in the remaining colours. The remaining two 
words were presented equally often (three times each per block) in all colours. Assignment of 
words to colours was counterbalanced across participants. The RGB values for the new stimulus 
colours were 255,255,0 (yellow) and 255,125,0 (orange). There were three contingency levels in 
the experiment: high (.50), medium (.25), and low (.17). 
 Procedure. The procedure was identical in all respects to Experiment 1, with the 
following exceptions. There were 432 trials in this experiment, consisting of 6 blocks of 72 trials 
each. To increase error frequency, participants had to respond before a 550 ms deadline when the 
stimulus display terminated. To avoid discouraging errors, only the “Too Slow” message for null 
responses had the 1000 ms “penalty duration” used in Experiment 1, whereas the “Incorrect” 
message for errors was set to the 250 ms duration used on correct trials. 
Results 
 The dependent measure for Experiment 2 was error percentages. Responses not made 
within the response deadline were considered spoiled trials and were excluded from analysis 
(approximately 20% of the data, reflecting the difficulty of this task). 
 The error percentages for Experiment 2 are presented in Figure 5. To broadly characterize 
the data, although we were able to induce adequately high errors, contingency effects were small 
in this experiment. This may have been due to the relatively weaker contingency manipulation 
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(.17-.50 rather than .25-.75) or due to difficulty learning contingencies with such a brief response 
window. A one-way ANOVA on contingency (high, medium, low) for errors was significant, 
F(2,188) = 12.068, MSE = 0.3, p < .001, ŋp2 = .114. As expected, planned comparisons revealed 
that high contingency trials (27.7%) generated fewer errors than medium contingency trials 
(30.1%), t(94) = 2.890, SEdiff = .8, p = .005, ŋp2 = .082, and low contingency trials (31.4%) 
generated more errors than medium contingency trials, t(94) = 1.929, SEdiff = .7, p = .028 one 
tailed, ŋp2 = .038. 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 Critically, we also assessed the hypothesis that this increase in errors for low contingency 
trials was due to an increase in the (incorrect) predicted response and found that the 36.4% errors 
for the predicted response was significantly greater than chance (33.3%), t(94) = 2.800, SE = 1.1, 
p = .006, ŋp2 = .077. We then tested the assumption that the interference observed for low 
contingency trials would be eliminated by removing the extra predicted errors. To do this, we 
calculated a fourth condition (shown in Figure 5), low contingency adjusted, that consists of the 
error frequency of only the non-predicted responses adjusted to the same scale as the other trial 
types. This was done with the formula: (low contingency) x (percentage unpredicted errors) x (3 
/ 2). As predicted, the resulting low contingency adjusted condition showed significantly fewer 
errors (30.0%) than the unadjusted low contingency condition (31.4%), t(94) = 3.036, SEdiff = .4, 
p = .003, ŋp2 = .089, and no difference in errors compared to medium contingency trials (30.1%), 
t(94) = .113, SEdiff = .7, p = .910, ŋp2 < .001. For this last comparison, there was sufficiently high 
power (.8) to detect an effect as small as 2%. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 replicated the findings of facilitation and interference in errors observed in 
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Reanalysis 2. Additionally, these analyses support the prediction of the contingency hypothesis 
that the interference effect in errors is due solely to the increase in errors for the predicted 
response: participants made more of the predicted errors than expected by chance, and when this 
increase was controlled for there was no difference in errors for medium and low contingency 
trials. This is inconsistent with any version of the modulation hypothesis that we can think of and 
provides further support for the notion that participants use the contingencies between words and 
responses to reduce the response threshold for the predicted response. 
General Discussion 
 Two new analyses of the data from Jacoby et al.’s (2003) along with the results of two 
new experiments converge with the results of other recent investigations (e.g., Schmidt et al., 
2007) to confirm a simple contingency account of the ISPC effect (and probably the majority of 
the proportion congruent effect). When Stroop effects are analyzed as a function of the 
predictability of the words (i.e., contingency), Stroop trial type (congruent, incongruent) does not 
interact with contingency in either the response latency or error data. This finding confirms the 
view that the entire ISPC effect (i.e., the highly replicated interaction between proportion 
congruency and Stroop trial type) can be accounted for by a main effect of Stroop trial type and a 
main effect of contingency. 
 Reanalysis 1 and Experiment 1 also demonstrated that contingency effects are solely 
facilitative in response times. That is, high contingency trials are speeded relative to medium 
(chance) contingency trials, but there is no disadvantage for low contingency trials relative to 
medium contingency. These results are inconsistent with the modulation hypothesis, but are 
entirely as predicted by the contingency hypothesis. According to the contingency hypothesis, 
response time facilitation occurs because participants are able to successfully predict the correct 
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response based on the word on these trials and shortcut processing by reducing the response 
threshold for the predicted response. This same mechanism further predicts facilitation for high 
contingency trials and interference for low contingency trials in errors. These predicted results 
for errors were observed in Reanalysis 2 and Experiment 2. Error facilitation is predicted 
according to this account because the threshold for the correct response is lowered when it is 
predictable (i.e., on high contingency trials) and it is therefore less likely that participants will 
make any other response. Error interference is also predicted, because the response threshold for 
one of the incorrect responses is lowered when it is predictable (i.e., on low contingency trials) 
and it is therefore more likely that participants will make this particular error. Further analyses in 
Experiment 2 confirmed that the increase in errors in the low contingency condition is due solely 
to the increase in the specific predicted incorrect response. 
Conflict Monitoring 
 These findings have important implications for the conflict monitoring framework of 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen (2001). Botvinick et al. propose that many of the 
effects observed in Stroop and Stroop-like paradigms can be explained by a conflict monitoring 
mechanism thought to lie in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). According to their account, the 
ACC detects conflict when it occurs (e.g., when a word and display colour indicate two different 
potential responses). After detecting conflict, attention is more stringently focused on the target. 
Through simulation work, Botvinick et al. have demonstrated that conflict monitoring can 
explain sequential Stroop effects (because attention to the target is increased following an 
incongruent trial) and the standard proportion congruent effect (because the greater number of 
incongruent trials in the low proportion congruent condition leads to more attention to the target 
dimension of colour block-wide). 
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 Clearly, the conflict monitoring account of the proportion congruent effect is a variant of 
the modulation hypothesis and suffers from the same shortcomings. In particular, the modulation 
hypothesis is unable to explain the ISPC effect, because the amount of conflict experienced prior 
to high and low proportion congruent trials is the same (i.e., because they are mixed within the 
same block). However, Blais, Robidoux, Risko, and Besner (in press) present a variant of the 
conflict monitoring account in which conflict is monitored separately for each item. For instance, 
each time YELLOW is presented as the distracter word, the level of conflict will be monitored. If 
YELLOW is presented most often in an incongruent colour, then overall conflict will be high. As 
such, when YELLOW is again encountered, attention to the colour will be highly focused, thus 
minimizing the impact of the word on performance. However, within the same block, BLUE 
may be presented most often in its congruent colour, resulting in low overall conflict for this 
word. As such, when the word BLUE is presented, attention to the colour will not be as focused, 
thus allowing the word to impact performance relatively more. Blais et al.’s variant of the 
conflict monitoring account can therefore explain the variations in the size of the Stroop effect 
when the proportion of congruent items is manipulated across items. But Blais et al.’s account 
simulates only the interaction between proportion congruency and Stroop trial type, and not the 
various other characteristics of the data (e.g., the fact that the effect is driven by the speeding of 
congruent trials in the high proportion congruent condition and incongruent trials in the low 
proportion congruent condition). More critically, their account cannot explain why contingency 
effects are still observed with colour-unrelated words: there is simply no differential conflict to 
monitor between the various conditions. 
 In summary, although the conflict monitoring model of Botvinick et al. (2001) provides a 
compelling explanation for sequential Stroop effects (which undoubtedly contribute to the simple 
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proportion congruent effect), the weight of the evidence suggests that the ISPC effect is better 
explained by contingency learning. Further, although sequential (trial n-1) effects contribute to 
the simple proportion congruent effect, it is our suggestion that the remainder (and bulk) of the 
effect is explained by contingency. 
Implications for Future Stroop Research 
 These results, successfully predicted by contingency hypothesis, illuminate an error in the 
popular conceptualization of proportion congruency manipulations. For instance, in the high 
proportion congruent condition of a two choice task, congruent words with high contingencies 
(e.g., BLUEblue) are being compared to incongruent words with low contingencies (e.g., 
BLUEgreen). That is, words are 75% predictive of the correct response in the congruent condition, 
but only 25% predictive of the correct response in the incongruent condition. The reverse is true 
in the low proportion congruent condition, where congruent words with low contingencies (e.g., 
ORANGEorange) are being compared to incongruent words with high contingencies (e.g., 
ORANGEyellow). In this sense, Stroop effects (i.e., facilitation and interference resulting from 
conflict in meaning between related concepts) are confounded with contingency effects (i.e., 
prediction of responses based on word-response correlations). 
 Given that the contingency hypothesis explanation of the proportion congruent effect 
appears sufficient, it would be prudent to question the “purity” of all Stroop effects emerging 
from methodologies with non-chance contingencies. Algom and colleagues have reached a 
similar conclusion (Dishon-Berkovits & Algom, 2000; Malara & Algom, 2003; Sabri, Melara, & 
Algom, 2001). The main methodological point is that, although non-chance contingencies may 
“maximize” the size of the Stroop effect (and thus its detectability), the said Stroop effect 
measure is confounded with contingency effects. Thus, any data collected with such a design 
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may not be applicable to the standard effect with chance contingencies. For instance, in a four-
colour Stroop task, each word should be presented in each colour 25% of the time (which is 
typically not the case). Any deviation from such contingencies will necessarily confound Stroop 
effects with contingency learning effects. This methodological point applies to all paradigms in 
which contingency information may aid responding. 
Conclusions 
 The results of two new analyses of previously published data (Jacoby et al., 2003) along 
with the results of two new experiments disconfirm the generally accepted and intuitively 
appealing modulation hypothesis, which explains the proportion congruent effect in terms of 
control over attention allocated to processing the word. On the other hand, these analyses provide 
consistent support for the contingency hypothesis, which explains the proportion congruent 
effect in terms of the predictability of words (i.e., contingency). Specifically, the results are 
consistent with the proposed response mechanism where participants decrease the threshold for 
the expected (high contingency) response. Of particular note, the contingency hypothesis 
successfully predicted differential results for response latencies and error rates. 
 Confirmation of the contingency hypothesis will likely be received with both frustration 
and excitement by researchers in cognitive psychology. The results may seem frustrating because 
they disconfirm the highly appealing modulation hypothesis and consequently bring into 
question the proper interpretation of the experiments that have made use of the paradigm over 
the last 25 years. On the other hand, the results should be exciting because they demonstrate the 
processing power and control of implicit processes and open the flood gates for research on 
implicit learning. 




 Note that even a true random factor will explain some proportion of variance with a partial eta 
squared (ŋp2) due to maximization on random error. This is true of all measures of effect size, 
such as R squared (R2). 
2
 The issue of sequential trial confounds can become even more complicated given that all 
congruent trials have high contingencies and all incongruent trials have low contingencies in the 
high proportion congruent block, whereas the reverse is true in the low proportion congruent 
block. 
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Table I - The relationship between proportion congruency, congruency, and contingency 
  Proportion Congruency 
  High Medium Low 













Note: As indicated by the highlighted cells, congruent and incongruent trials are not matched for 
contingency in the high and low proportion congruent conditions. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Response threshold model of contingency effects. If ORANGE is presented most often 
in yellow, then when ORANGE is presented the threshold for the yellow response will be 
lower than the threshold for all other potential responses (e.g., orange). 
Figure 2. Bottom: mean response latencies in milliseconds from Jacoby, Lindsay, and Hessels 
(2003) for congruent and incongruent trials with high, medium, and low contingencies. Top: 
original organization of the data. 
Figure 3. Bottom: error percentages from Jacoby, Lindsay, and Hessels (2003) for congruent and 
incongruent trials with high, medium, and low contingencies. Bottom: original organization of 
the data. 
Figure 4. Experiment 1 mean response latencies in milliseconds for high, medium, and low 
contingency trials. Error percentages are in parentheses. 
Figure 5. Experiment 2 error percentages for high, medium, and low contingency trials. 
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